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ABSTRACT
Cyber security is increasingly a challenge for organizations everywhere. Defense
systems that require less expert knowledge and can adapt quickly to threats are strongly
needed to combat the rise of cyber attacks. Computational intelligence techniques can be
used to rapidly explore potential solutions while searching in a way that is unaffected by
human bias.
Several architectures have been created for developing and testing systems used
in network security, but most are meant to provide a platform for running cyber security
experiments as opposed to automating experiment processes. In the first paper, we propose
a framework termed Distributed Cyber Security Automation Framework for Experiments
(DCAFE) that enables experiment automation and control in a distributed environment.
Predictive analysis of adversaries is another thorny issue in cyber security. Game
theory can be used to mathematically analyze adversary models, but its scalability limita-
tions restrict its use. Computational game theory allows us to scale classical game theory
to larger, more complex systems. In the second paper, we propose a framework termed Co-
evolutionary Agent-based Network Defense Lightweight Event System (CANDLES) that
can coevolve attacker and defender agent strategies and capabilities and evaluate potential
solutions with a custom network defense simulation.
The third paper is a continuation of the CANDLES project in which we rewrote key
parts of the framework. Attackers and defenders have been redesigned to evolve pure strat-
egy, and a new network security simulation is devised which specifies network architecture
and adds a temporal aspect. We also add a hill climber algorithm to evaluate the search
space and justify the use of a coevolutionary algorithm.
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SECTION
1. INTRODUCTION
Cyber security is increasingly a challenge for organizations ranging from business
to government, as well as individual users. As more devices are connected to the Inter-
net, they become more accessible, but it also implies more potential targets and a larger
attack surface area that requires careful fortification. Defense systems that require less ex-
pert knowledge and can adapt quickly to threats are strongly needed to combat the rise of
cyber attacks. Unfortunately, trying to enumerate all possible attack vectors and defensive
strategies is not feasible. Computational intelligence techniques can be used to effectively
explore many potential solutions in a reasonable timeframe and may yield unintuitive solu-
tions since they are unaffected by human bias.
Complex configuration schemes and a distributed architecture are often required
when developing and testing systems used in network security. Several architectures have
been created for this purpose, but most of them are meant to provide a platform for running
cyber security experiments as opposed to automating experiment processes. In the first
paper, we propose a framework termed Distributed Cyber Security Automation Framework
for Experiments (DCAFE) that employs software agents to manage system roles, emulate
end users, automate data collection, analyze results, and initiate new experiments without
human intervention. The framework was used to run experiments that optimized Windows
logging configurations in order to quickly find indicators of compromise. The contribution
of the work is the creation of a model for experiment automation and control in a distributed
system environment.
2Predictive analysis of adversaries is another thorny issue in cyber security. Game
theory can be used to mathematically analyze adversary models, but its scalability limita-
tions restrict its use to simple, abstract models. Computational game theory allows us to
scale classical game theory to large, complex systems capable of modeling real-world en-
vironments. In the second paper, we choose to utilize coevolution, an approach where each
player’s fitness is dependent on its adversaries, since attackers and defenders in network
security fit the adversarial model. Here we propose a framework termed Coevolutionary
Agent-based Network Defense Lightweight Event System (CANDLES) that can coevolve
attacker and defender agent strategies and capabilities and evaluate potential solutions with
a custom, abstract computer network defense simulation.
The third paper is a continuation of the CANDLES project in which we rewrote
key parts of the framework. Attackers and defenders have been redesigned to evolve pure
strategy, rather than a combination of strategy and available capabilities, or components. A
new network security simulation is devised which specifies network architecture as a graph
and uses a constrained number of discrete turns to add a temporal aspect. Then we add a
hill climber algorithm to evaluate the search space and justify the use of a coevolutionary
algorithm.
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ABSTRACT
Cyber security has quickly become an overwhelming challenge for governments,
businesses, private organizations, and individuals. In an increasingly connected world, the
trend is for resources to be accessible from anywhere at any time. Greater access to re-
sources implies more targets and potentially a larger surface area for attacks, which makes
securing systems more difficult. Automated and semi-automated solutions are needed to
keep up with the deluge of modern threats, but designing such systems requires a dis-
tributed architecture to support development and testing. Several such architectures exist,
but most only focus on providing a platform for running cyber security experiments as
opposed to automating experiment processes. In response to this need, we have built a
distributed framework based on software agents which can manage system roles, automate
data collection, analyze results, and run new experiments without human intervention. The
contribution of this work is the creation of a model for experiment automation and control
4in a distributed system environment, and this paper provides a detailed description of our
framework based on that model.
1. INTRODUCTION
A significant challenge in developing cyber security software is the difficulty in
building a suitable test environment. While powerful network and software platforms ex-
ist, they typically focus on enabling researchers to run experiments and collect data rather
than managing the experiments and reacting dynamically based on results. A user for one
of these platforms might start by spending weeks setting up an experiment. Then the exper-
iment is run, results are collected and manually analyzed, and tweaks are made to system
parameters before running the experiment again. This cycle can continue hundreds or thou-
sands of times and divert limited resources without further automation of the experimental
process. As such, it is highly beneficial to automate management of system roles, data
collection, result analysis, experimental parameters, and experiment execution.
In this paper, we present the Distributed Cyber Security Automation Framework
for Experiments (DCAFE). DCAFE consists of several distributed controls, implemented
as software agents, running on a network of virtual machines (VMs). It was initially de-
signed for gathering and analyzing Windows event log data, though that is only one of many
possible uses for this system. Our goal was to find an optimal data collection configuration
to detect a given attack or network enumeration technique. As such, that experimental ob-
jective guided many of our design decisions.
The VMs implemented here represent the attacker, victim, and central control sys-
tem in the network. The distributed agents are designed to automate the user roles of
attacker and victim, gather and analyze event data, and synchronize actions from a central
point in the network. However, while our implementation utilizes a synchronous com-
5munication model, it is important to note that DCAFE is fully capable of operating in an
asynchronous environment. The agents are synchronous in our implementation due to a
specific requirement in our experiments; namely, communicating accurate time windows
during data collection requires that agents are aware when various actions are completed
on the network.
2. RELATED WORK
Several platforms exist for implementing cyber security testbeds, though none di-
rectly enable the automation capabilities that we describe. Emulab is a network testbed
with extensive auto-configuration and large-scale experimentation capabilities. It allows
for the use of emulation with arbitrary network topologies or even live testing on the In-
ternet by using the RON and PlanetLab testbeds [1]. While Emulab provides a plausible
foundation for our approach, it is not designed for experiment automation. Our model
could be implemented in experiments run with Emulab at the cost of Emulab’s far greater
hardware and software environment prerequisites. While possible, keeping the model sep-
arate means greater applicability to a variety of system environments.
Similarly, Cyber Defense Technology Experimental Research (DETER) is a com-
plex framework used for risky experiment management, experiment health monitoring, and
dynamic federation of different testbed facilities [2]. While using this framework might
have allowed more exact control and monitoring of the experiment, it is not designed to
automate system or user roles.
Several unnamed Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) testbeds
have also been designed for single simulation, federated simulation, and emula-
tion/implementation [3]. These are useful as general models, but are specific to SCADA
systems at the implementation level. Since our research involves typical desktop and server
6operating environments, SCADA frameworks fall outside the experiment scope. Also, ex-
periment automation is not considered by these testbeds.
Strategic and Tactical Resiliency Against Threats to Ubiquitous Systems (STRA-
TUS) is a model-driven framework used for attack detection and mitigation. It utilizes
models for missions, components, vulnerabilities, trust levels, attack plans, and host and
cluster organization [4]. While this is not relevant to testbed technology, it is comparable to
our example implementation as another model designed for attack detection. While STRA-
TUS may be a viable model, we preferred a more lightweight approach.
In general, no existing framework met the needs of our planned experiments. A
virtualization platform with internal networking, emulated hardware, and desktop/server
operating systems was necessary, as well as a distributed software agent design and sev-
eral system-specific capabilities. Data had to be contained on-site, and penetration testing
had to be possible without disrupting outside systems or networks. Most importantly, the
framework had to enable full automation of experimental procedures. DCAFE was devel-
oped to meet these requirements.
3. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
3.1. System Virtualization. Oracle VM VirtualBox was chosen as the virtu-
alization platform due to its popularity and ease of use [5]. Three VMs were created
and connected to an ‘internal network’ created by Virtualbox. Each VM ran a different
operating system (OS): Windows 7, Kali Linux, or Ubuntu Server. Each was chosen due to
its unique traits and suitability for a given role in the experiment. Occasionally, programs
and frameworks were also installed on each VM to facilitate experimental procedures.
System roles and responsibilities are listed in Table 1.1.




victim Windows 7 Snare Agent sends event




requested by the com-
mand server.
attacker Kali Linux Execute attack com-
mands for the software
agent.
Launch attacks and net-
work scans when re-
quested by the com-
mand server.
command server Ubuntu Server The service rsyslog is
used to receive event log
data in Syslog format
from the victim.
Isolate and analyze vic-
tim event logs, deter-
mine Snare configura-
tions to test, send attack
commands, and output
results.
Windows 7 was chosen for the victim role due to its enormous popularity in busi-
ness, government, and individual use. Snare Agent for Windows [6], a program designed
to collect and transfer event log information in real-time, was also installed and configured
to send system log data to a Syslog server in the virtual network. Kali Linux was chosen
for the attacker role due to its penetration testing capabilities and popularity with cyber
security professionals. Ubuntu Server was chosen for the command server role due to its
broad support, documentation, and easy setup for Syslog, SSH, and related capabilities.
It is worth noting that scalability could be a concern depending on the number of
available Windows licenses. Also, should tens or hundreds of systems be necessary for a
particular experiment, one might prefer an emulation platform with more autoconfiguration
capabilities than VirtualBox. In that case, a testbed like Emulab might be a better option.
3.2. Software Agent Design. Distributed software agents are used here to control
the experimental process, configure services on the fly, execute actions in various system
8roles, and automate data collection and analysis. Several communication models can be
used with the agents, including peer-to-peer, client-server, hybrid, and subscription mod-
els. Agents can either work autonomously, deciding when to act on their own, or accept
commands from other agents. Regardless of the design choices, any agent must be able
to execute actions for its given role and communicate with other agents as necessary. One
possible implementation is described here.
All of our VMs have a software agent written in Python. These agents are initial-
ized with root privileges, and each plays a particular role in the experimental procedure.
All agents communicate with each other as necessary by sending commands and data over
network sockets using JavaScript Object Notation (JSON). The attacker and victim agents
are ‘dumb’ agents in the sense that they only take orders from the command agent and
reply when requested tasks have been completed. All agents operate synchronously in the
sense that only a single agent can perform an action while the others wait, even though
other actions may be carried out simultaneously by the operating systems where the agents
reside.
The attacker agent receives messages in JSON format from the command agent.
These messages contain commands (strings) and a duration in seconds for each command
(integers). The attacker agent executes each command in a subshell and then waits for the
specified duration. Once all commands are complete, the agent will reply with a comple-
tion message to the command agent.
The victim agent also receives messages in JSON format from the command agent.
These messages contain Snare Objective Configuration rules. The victim agent stops the
Snare service, clears the current configuration from the Windows Registry, inserts new
rules, and restarts the Snare service. Then the agent will reply with a completion message
to the command agent.
9The command agent tracks experiment progress, isolates and analyzes Syslog data,
generates Snare configurations and attack commands, and periodically outputs configura-
tion and result information to a file. This is the only intelligent agent, changing its actions
according to feedback from experimental data. It coordinates the actions for all other agents
and stores all results locally.
3.3. Snare Configuration Generation. A Snare Objective Configuration is com-
posed of an arbitrary number of rules. Multiple options can be selected on a given rule to
gather various types of data at different levels, from very broad to extremely detailed. The
major categories and relevant values that were manipulated for Snare rules during these
experiments are listed in Table 1.2.
Due to the many levels of detail for logging capabilities, it is possible to start with a
set of Snare configuration rules that each represent a highly inclusive general category, and
then depending on which results are most interesting, explore more narrow configurations.
In this iterative process, the first round of configurations might use different event IDs, but
include all event sources and return values per rule. The next round might use one event ID
and one event source per rule, but still have all return values. Each round can have many
iterations depending on which of the previous candidates were accepted and require further
investigation, and at every level, only one rule is ever tested at a time. Eventually, a set
of extremely narrow but useful rules will remain, and those will be output as results for
manual review. Note that this algorithm is greedy in that not every configuration is consid-
ered even though all types of data are analyzed for their usefulness. As a result, there are
potential circumstances under which this algorithm may return suboptimal results.
The reason why this approach works so well for Snare data is best described with
a visual analogy. Suppose Snare configurations can be represented by a map. The largest
sections of the map are rules for all-inclusive general categories of data, while smaller sec-
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Table 1.2. Important Fields with Corresponding Attribute Values in Snare Rules
Event ID Event Source Return Value
File_Events Active Directory Service ActivityTracing
Filtering_Events Application Critical
Logon_Logoff DFS-Replication Error
Process_Events Domain Name Server Failure




tions within them are the more specific rules. Data generated by each configuration is a
hill in the landscape, with the height of each hill determined by the volume of the data
produced. We found through experimentation that most of the landscape is flat, at least for
baseline data (generated by system processes) and attack data. This means that the most
specific rules rarely generated any data at all, and broad categories tended to either produce
useful data quickly or not at all. Due to this property, it was possible to scan the landscape
at a high level, then quickly drill down and find the most specific rules possible to provide
potential attack indicators.
4. ITERATIVE EXPERIMENT PROCEDURE
The experiment procedure is initialized by powering on all the VMs and initializ-
ing the agents on the victim and attacker VMs who await further commands. The main
control program on the command server is started by the user, at which point the following
automated iterative procedure commences (visualized in Fig. 1.1):
1. The command server determines the current Snare configuration to test and sends an
update command to the victim.
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Figure 1.1. System Interaction Diagram
2. The victim updates the configuration and restarts Snare, then sends a completion
message to the command server.
3. The command server gathers baseline data. This requires waiting an arbitrary amount
of time for events caused by Windows background processes to accumulate. It then
copies the results to a separate file for later analysis.
4. The command server gathers attack data. This is done the same way as baseline
data, except that a command is sent to the attack machine while data accumulates.
Every command in our experiments requires sending some type of data to the victim.
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The attack machine executes the command and returns a completion message to the
command server.
5. The baseline data is compared to the attack data, and any unique events or event types
in the attack data are noted as possible attack indicators.
6. Unless all Snare configurations have been tested or rejected, restart the process from
Step 1.
4.1. Event Log Analysis. Analyzing event logs requires comparing baseline data
to attack data. Baseline data consists of events generated by normal Windows processes.
No user actions were included in the baseline data, though the software agent was running
in a command window on the victim machine in order to update Snare configurations as
necessary. Both a Pass-the-Hash exploit and a SYN Stealth scan were used to generate
attack data in separate runs of the experiment.
The first attack, Pass-the-Hash, is a technique that allows an intruder to authenticate
on a remote system with the hashed value for a user’s password [7]. Since many systems
hash passwords as a security measure, it can be easier to obtain the hashed value as opposed
to getting the password in plain text. The second attack, a SYN Stealth scan, is also called
a TCP SYN scan or half-open scan. It can reliably determine whether a network port is
open, closed, or filtered, and it is considered stealthy since it does not fully establish a con-
nection [8]. This makes it less likely to show up in event logs for systems or applications.
Once baseline and attack behaviors were determined, data gathering and analysis
could begin. All analysis starts with raw event data, and an example of this is shown in
Fig. 1.2. Note that the victim’s hostname is duna, and the event indicates that a network
connection was permitted by the Windows Filtering Platform.
Pre-processing was applied to the raw event data in order to facilitate clustering and
to reduce the dimensionality of the data. Numerical data and punctuation were stripped
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from the events to leave only the terms composed of ASCII text. These were then converted
into lowercase and used to build term sets. The example event from Fig. 1.2 is translated
into the term set in Fig. 1.3.
Next, the baseline events were clustered, followed by the attack events. If the attack
events formed new clusters using the baseline data, then the attack data was considered
unique enough to provide a possible attack indicator. Any attack indicator, and its Snare
configuration by association, was also given an objective value and stored in the final results
if the value exceeded a user-specified threshold.
Dec 26 16:21:21 duna MSWinEventLog 4 Security 7 Thu Dec 26 16:21:21
2013 5156 Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing N/A N/A Success Audit
duna Filtering Platform Connection The Windows Filtering Platform
has permitted a connection. Application Information: Process ID: 4
Application Name: System Network Information: Direction: Inbound
Source Address: 192.168.66.3 Source Port: 445 Destination Address:
192.168.66.4 Destination Port: 37041 Protocol: 6 Filter Information:
Filter Run-Time ID: 66057 Layer Name: Receive/Accept Layer Run-Time
ID: 44 6
Figure 1.2. Example Snare Event
{, 'receive', 'filtering', 'protocol', 'connection', 'auditing',
'process', 'platform', 'dec', 'thu', 'run', 'security', 'name', 'id',
'network', 'source', 'direction', 'port', 'microsoft', 'information',
'permitted', 'time', 'the', 'destination', 'a', 'mswineventlog',
'success', 'windows', 'n', 'inbound', 'system', 'layer', 'address',
'audit', 'filter', 'accept', 'duna', 'has', 'application'}
Figure 1.3. Example Event Term Set
4.2. Clustering Algorithm. The clustering method was designed with the event
logs in mind, for highly textual data with unreliable timestamps due to clock drift. For this
purpose, we built a custom algorithm similar to the crisp nearest prototype classifier [9]
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which addresses the specific needs of our experiments. In particular, the natural organiza-
tion of the data is exhibited through the behavior of an agglomerative clustering algorithm
with dynamic classes. Each event can belong to only one cluster, and events start out with
no cluster membership initially. There is no labeled data, and the number of clusters is not
specified since they are dynamically generated. Each cluster consists of one or more events,
but is represented by a prototype for ease of calculations and lower space complexity. The
prototype is a set containing all terms from the cluster members. A similarity threshold is
used when deciding if an event should join a cluster, and the similarity measure is defined
in (1.1).
similarity =
(number o f matching terms)×2
(total number o f terms)
(1.1)
The similarity measure is symmetric in that the order of the input and prototype
does not affect the result. This method also prevents any cluster from spreading too far,
a property which encourages formation of smaller and more distinct clusters. Pseudocode
for the clustering algorithm is provided in Algorithm 1. Note that any cluster prototype
and event term set are unlikely to have the same number of terms, and the similarity can
never exceed 1.0. The reason for multiplying the number of matching terms by two is to
normalize the range of similarity values to [0,1]. If the similarity exceeds the similarity
threshold for the current iteration, then the event joins the cluster. If the event in question
is not found to be similar enough to any existing cluster, a new cluster is formed with the
event as its only member.
4.3. Objective Value Calculation. The objective value of the Snare configuration
for a given event set is calculated by starting with a low similarity threshold (0.1), forming
clusters with the baseline data, and attempting to form new clusters with the attack data.
Should zero new clusters be formed from the attack data, the threshold is incrementally
increased, and the clustering process is repeated. The objective value is calculated as the
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inverse of the similarity threshold required for the attack data to form new clusters, as
defined in (1.2). Pseudocode for the objective value algorithm is provided in Algorithm 2.




The result is that attack data with highly distinctive events compared to the baseline
will form new clusters at a low similarity threshold, consequently receiving a high objective
value. Should new clusters not form at any threshold (or if zero events are available for a
given Snare configuration), the objective value is zero. Any Snare configuration with an
objective value of zero is immediately rejected, while all others are stored for later analysis.
In practice, due to the flat data landscape, we found most Snare configurations to have an
objective value of zero.
5. PRELIMINARY RESULTS
Initial experiments run using DCAFE have resulted in finding several indicators of
compromise representing known exploits. While we cannot elaborate on those results at
present due to their sensitive nature, they have provided useful direction for later experi-
ments and validation of DCAFE’s usefulness in experiment automation.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper introduces DCAFE, a practical, light-weight, distributed framework for
the automation of cyber security research experiments, based on software agents, which can
manage system roles, automate data collection, analyze results, and run new experiments
without human intervention. For a given attack specification, DCAFE has demonstrated
its ability to discover event log configurations containing indicators of compromise, which
can be fruitfully employed by attack detection mechanisms.
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DCAFE currently provides a model and example implementation for distributed
software agents used to automate the experimental process. This paper is meant to act as
a guide for others to design similar agents and implement the technologies described here.
Unfortunately, the source code from our own experiments cannot currently be released due
to the sensitive nature of the work. As such, future work might involve the creation of a
standard software package that other researchers could download and use as a base for their
own experiment designs.
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Algorithm 1 Clustering Algorithm
function CALCULATESIMILARITY(setA, setB)
numO f Matches← 0
for each termA in setA do
if termA in setB then




return numO f Matches/total
end function
function FORMCLUSTERS(eventList, clusterList, clusterFormationT hreshold)
for each event in eventList do
bestMatch← None
bestScore←−1
for each cluster in clusterList do
similarity← CALCULATESIMILARITY(cluster,event)
















Algorithm 2 Objective Value Algorithm
SIMILARITY _T HRESHOLD_ST EP_SIZE← 0.1
SIMILARITY _T HRESHOLD_MAX ← 1.0
function CALCULATEOBJECTIVEVALUE(baselineEvents, attackEvents)
ob jectiveValue← 0.0
similarityT hreshold← SIMILARITY _T HRESHOLD_ST EP_SIZE





if LENGTH(allClusters)> LENGTH(normalClusters) then
ob jectiveValue← 1.0/similarityT hreshold
break
end if
similarityT hreshold← similarityT hreshold+
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ABSTRACT
Predicting an adversary’s capabilities, intentions, and probable vectors of attack is
in general a complex and arduous task. Cyber space is particularly vulnerable to unforeseen
attacks, as most computer networks have a large, complex, opaque attack surface area and
are therefore extremely difficult to analyze. Abstract adversarial models which capture the
pertinent features needed for analysis, can reduce the complexity sufficiently to make anal-
ysis feasible. Game theory allows for mathematical analysis of adversarial models; how-
ever, its scalability limitations restrict its use to simple, abstract models. Computational
game theory is focused on scaling classical game theory to large, complex systems capable
of modeling real-world environments; one promising approach is coevolution where each
player’s fitness is dependent on its adversaries. In this paper, we propose the Coevolution-
ary Agent-based Network Defense Lightweight Event System (CANDLES), a framework
designed to coevolve attacker and defender agent strategies and evaluate potential solutions
with a custom, abstract computer network defense simulation. By performing a qualitative
analysis of the result data, we provide a proof of concept for the applicability of coevolu-
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tion in planning for, and defending against, novel attacker strategies in computer network
security.
1. INTRODUCTION
Great strides are needed in the defensive tools and technologies available to cy-
ber security practitioners, as the asymmetric nature of cyber warfare [1] puts defending
practitioners at a distinct disadvantage; i.e., cyber attackers get to decide when and where
to attack, without the need for physical presence providing advance notice to the cyber
defenders who must scramble to quickly determine that an attack is occurring, select an
appropriate defense, and execute it. In cyber security, as in many security-related fields, it
can be prudent to evaluate worst-case attack scenarios. Whether facing insider threats or
sophisticated adversaries outside one’s networks, it is important to develop threat and at-
tack models such that one can predict an adversary’s capabilities, intentions, and probably
vectors of attack. Cyber space is particularly vulnerable to unforseen attacks due to most
computer networks having a large, complex, opaque attack surface area and therefore being
extremely difficult to analyze. Invariably, the large number of variables involved in both
offensive and defensive strategies makes an exhaustive search of all strategies infeasible.
Abstract adversarial models which capture the pertinent features needed to analyze such
strategies, can reduce the complexity sufficiently to make analysis feasible.
Game theory allows for mathematical analysis of adversarial models; however, its
scalability limitations restrict its use to simple, abstract models. Computational game the-
ory is focused on scaling classical game theory to large, complex systems capable of mod-
eling real-world environments; one promising approach is coevolution where each player’s
fitness is dependent on its adversaries. Coevolution can be employed to explore the as-
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sociated search spaces, examining strategic capabilities and estimating how each side will
adapt in response to moves made by an opponent.
It makes sense to focus resources on securing systems such that attacks become
less effective. There are several well-known ways to harden systems against attack, from
limiting access permissions to patching software and reducing exposed network services.
These are useful measures to reduce the attack surface and make it easier to defend vital
assets. Yet for all the efforts taken to secure systems, intrusions still occur in many organi-
zations, often without their knowledge [1]. Once it is acknowledged that intrusions cannot
be stopped entirely, awareness, damage mitigation, and disaster recovery become important
goals. In particular, knowing how an adversary could break into a network and devising
possible counter-strategies is vital. In this paper, we propose the Coevolutionary Agent-
based Network Defense Lightweight Event System (CANDLES), a framework designed
to coevolve attacker and defender agent strategies and evaluate potential solutions with a
custom, abstract computer network defense simulation. Our approach coevolves two pop-
ulations containing attacker and defender strategies in a network defense scenario, and the
fitness of strategies is determined through simulations. In this way, unique, near-optimal
strategies for both sides can be discovered. By performing a qualitative analysis of the
result data, we provide a proof of concept for the applicability of coevolution in planning
for, and defending against, novel worst-case attacker strategies in computer network secu-
rity, allowing an end user to develop strategies and set up test scenarios. This offers new
possibilities for analyzing and reinforcing defensive capabilities against unknown threats.
2. RELATED WORK
Coevolution has been used to find better placements for Flexible AC Transmission
System (FACTS) devices [2], which are used to prevent cascading blackouts in electric
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transmission systems [3], and also to evolve attackers and defenders for graph-based net-
work theory models [4]. Defenses have been designed that can predict the behavior of
adaptive adversaries using a combination of game theory and machine learning [5], and
machine learning has likewise been used to predict the nature of relationships in adversar-
ial social networks [6]. Strategies have been developed for defending against Distributed
Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks using a Bayesian game theoretic framework [7], and
hidden Markov models have been developed to detect cyber attacks in network traffic [8].
Current approaches to developing computer network defense strategies largely fo-
cus on either pure game theoretic models [9] or real world implementations and emulated
systems [10, 11]. Emulated systems more accurately reflect real world conditions, but
require a fair amount of resources and configuration knowledge. Game theoretic mod-
els are mathematically elegant, but they do not scale well to larger solution spaces. Our
approach falls somewhere in the middle, as our experiments employ a custom network se-
curity simulation. Coevolution allows us to approximate game theory solutions for large
search spaces, thus providing scalability beyond the limits of classic game theory, and the
simulation provides a more realistic strategy evaluation without the configuration difficulty
of most emulated systems.
3. METHODOLOGY
There are two main parts to the CANDLES framework: the coevolutionary al-
gorithm (CoEA) and the network security simulation. A CoEA was chosen over other
stochastic methods since it most closely represents the natural dynamic between attackers
and defenders in cyber space. Namely, they evolve their capabilities over time in response
to actions taken by opponents. The network security simulation was developed to evaluate
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potential solutions in the CoEA, and it is used to simulate cyber defense scenarios given an
abstract set of capabilities for both attackers and defenders.
In our model, attacker capabilities include exploits and reconnaissance, or recon.
Recon techniques identify features of defender machines or networks and increase the
chance of exploit success. Exploits are used to compromise a vulnerability and deliver
a payload used to exfiltrate data. In our simulation, a vulnerability may be specific to a
service or operating system, and there are no payloads designed to damage enemy systems.
This is meant to model a stealthy attacker with advanced intrusion capabilities and a desire
to gather as much information as possible. Attacker profit is defined in the simulation as
the total amount of information exfiltrated from the defender’s machines.
Defender capabilities include detection systems, mitigation techniques, and shut-
ting down machines. Detection systems attempt to detect both exploits and reconnaissance
and inform the defender. Upon detection, dynamic mitigation techniques can be used to
attempt to stop the attack. Should the attack not be detected or if dynamic mitigation
fails, then static mitigation techniques may still prevent the attack from working. Dynamic
mitigation is meant to represent an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS), whereas static mit-
igation represents passive defenses like closed network ports, software patches, or limited
user privileges. Paranoia is also used to represent how alert a defender is after exploits have
been detected, and high paranoia will eventually cause the defender to shut down targeted
machines.
3.1. Classes. This section describes classes that provide the structural basis for the
rest of the framework.
3.1.1. Action. The Action class represents a possible action by any entity in the
simulation, and it specifies both a target and a technique. Since currently only Attackers
use Actions, techniques can be either Recon Techniques or Exploits.
25
3.1.2. Attacker. The Attacker class is initialized with an Attacker Solution and
executes Actions during the simulation. Which Actions to use are determined using ca-
pabilities in the Attacker Solution, and state information is used to track reconnaissance
information and event history. The structure for this class is visualized in Fig. 1.4.
3.1.3. Attacker Solution. An Attacker Solution specifies attack capabilities by
defining available Recon Techniques and Exploits, and it specifies strategy through a target
list of Defender Machines. In general, an attacker should not attack too many targets since
that raises the Defender’s paranoia level, which makes it harder to extract information once
machines are shut down. On the other hand, attacking too few targets or targets of low value
will not provide enough profit to be worthwhile. Attacker Solutions compose the first of
two populations in the CoEA, and they are initialized using population seeds as described
in Subsection 4.4.
3.1.4. Defender. The Defender class is initialized with a Defender Solution and re-
sponds to Actions by an attacker using detection systems and mitigation techniques. State
information is used here to track the paranoia level. Paranoia is a mechanism that increases
with detected exploits and allows the Defender to shut down machines upon reaching cer-
tain thresholds. Note that shutting down machines incurs a passive cost for productivity
loss, but it prevents further data exfiltration. The structure for this class is visualized in
Fig. 1.5.
3.1.5. Defender Machine. Each Defender Machine has a unique ID, intrinsic
value, operating system, and list of available services. State information tracks whether
the machine is active and any status effects incurred as a result of Exploits or Recon Tech-
niques.
3.1.6. Defender Solution. A Defender Solution specifies a Defender’s capabilities
by defining available Detection Systems and Dynamic Mitigations, and it specifies strategy
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Figure 1.4. Attacker Diagram
through suspected targets and paranoia thresholds. Suspected targets are used to perform
extra defensive measures with a one-time cost, and paranoia thresholds are used to deter-
mine when to shut down machines. Defender Solutions compose the second population in
the CoEA, and they are initialized using population seeds as described in Subsection 4.4.
3.1.7. Detection System. Each Detection System has a one-time installation cost
and four separate detection probabilities for the following events against any target: suc-
cessful recon, failed recon, successful exploit, and failed exploit.
3.1.8. Dynamic Mitigation. Each Dynamic Mitigation has a local execution cost,
a user cost (to represent spent effort or time), and a probability of success. Note that
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Figure 1.5. Defender Diagram
Dynamic Mitigations can also be used as a static defensive measure on suspected targets.
This means the costs are only incurred once per suspected target, but they are incurred
regardless of whether or not that target is attacked.
3.1.9. Exploit. Each Exploit has a value multiplier, a probability of success, and
one or more constraints. The value multiplier indicates the utility of the payload since a
higher multiplier will extract more value, representing information, from a given Defender
Machine. The constraints specify the operating system or services required for the Exploit
to function correctly.
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3.1.10. Recon Technique. Each Recon Technique has type information and a
probability of success. Type information indicates which effect the Recon Technique will
have if successful, and the three possible effects are to increase the probability of exploit
success, identify the OS, or identify running services.
3.2. Coevolutionary Algorithm. The CoEA evolves a population of Attacker So-
lutions against a population of Defender Solutions. Attacker Solutions use targets, Recon
Techniques, and Exploits while Defender Solutions use paranoia thresholds, a budget, sus-
pected targets, Detection Systems, and Dynamic Mitigations. Note that in both solution
classes, targets are references to Defender Machines. Both Attacker and Defender Solu-
tions are initialized from population seeds as covered in Subsection 4.4.
Parent selection is random, and survivor selection uses truncation. For recombina-
tion, a random subset of values are chosen for each variable from each parent. For mutation,
a target or technique is randomly added or removed from the given solution. Defender So-
lutions can also mutate paranoia thresholds to any value with a step size of 0.1 in the range
[0, 1]. Note that paranoia thresholds specify the necessary paranoia level for a Defender
to shut down machines, whereas the paranoia level itself just specifies how paranoid the
Defender is at any time during a given simulation.
Fitness evaluation for any individual requires measuring its performance multiple
times against several opponent solutions in the network security simulation and averag-
ing the results. The exact number of opponents and number of simulations per opponent
are determined by the CoEA configuration (listed in Subsection 4.3). Pseudocode for the
fitness function is provided in Algorithm 3.
One unique aspect of our CoEA is that the fitness function is asymmetric. The
attacker only attempts to maximize its profit (representative of information gained), but the
defender wants to both minimize the attacker’s profit and minimize its own costs. To do
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for each opponent in randomlyChosenOpponents do
simulationResults← None
for i in RANGE(NUM_OF_SIMULAT IONS) do
de f enderCosts,attackerPro f it← RUNSIMULATION(individual,opponent)
if individual.class = Attacker then
result←−attackerPro f it
else if individual.class = De f ender then









this, the fitness value per simulation is calculated as shown in (1.3) and (1.4).
attacker f itness =−(attacker pro f it) (1.3)
de f ender f itness =−(attacker pro f it)− (de f ender costs) (1.4)
It is important to point out that fitness is determined on a scale of (−∞,0], and attackers
always want to minimize their fitness value while defenders want to maximize theirs. This
mirrors reality in that the best case for defenders in cyber security is having zero losses
from attacks and zero resources spent on defense, resulting in a maximum fitness value of
zero. Attackers attempt to minimize their fitness value so that the attacker profit can be
represented the same way in both equations.
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3.3. Network Security Simulation. The network security simulation follows this
process:
1. Attacker and Defender are initialized from solutions.
2. Defender prepares initial defenses.
3. Event loop begins:
(a) Attacker performs an action (or does nothing).
(b) Defender responds as necessary.
(c) Passive costs are calculated.
(d) Exit the loop if Attacker does not act.
During initialization, the Attacker will build attack sequences based on all possible com-
binations of available targets and techniques. It should be emphasized that the Attacker
Solution only specifies the targets and techniques available for composing Actions in the
attack sequence, and the Attacker’s strategy for building attack sequences is static. The De-
fender then prepares its initial defense capabilities, which involves calculating installation
costs for detection systems and static defensive measures. At this point, the main event
loop begins. During each iteration of the event loop, the Attacker will start by looking up
its next planned Action. If there are recon Actions remaining, those will be given prior-
ity. Should an exploit Action be selected, it will be executed only if the exploit constraints
match any known recon information for the target. The Defender will respond to either
recon or exploits by attempting to detect and mitigate them. If the event is successfully
detected, dynamic mitigations are applied. If dynamic mitigations fail or if the event is not
detected, then static mitigations may still take effect for suspected targets. The Defender
also has a paranoia level which increases when exploits are detected. Should paranoia reach
certain thresholds, then targeted machines will be shut down upon further detection of ex-
ploits or data exfiltration. Passive costs are also calculated for each iteration of the event
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loop. The only passive costs are currently those for productivity loss by inactive Defender
Machines, which are meant to balance out the tendency of a Defender Solution to simply
shut down machines in order to block all attacks. Finally, should the Attacker have zero
planned actions remaining, the event loop terminates.
4. EXPERIMENT PROCEDURE
The objective of our experiments is to demonstrate that coevolution can be used to
explore and evaluate strategies in a cyber defense simulation. To this end, we have designed
a number of experiments to explore various offensive and defensive scenarios.
4.1. Experiment Variables. The variables for individual experiments are the at-
tacker population seed, defender population seed, and whether or not each population
evolves (listed in Table 1.3). Population seeds are individual solutions used as a tem-
plate for all population members during initialization, and they are listed as weak or strong
depending on their capabilities. We also examine both static and dynamic populations in
order to examine evolution in different contexts. It is easier, for example, to determine how
well a population is evolving against a static opponent since it is not considered a moving
target.
4.2. Result Data Format. There are 30 CoEA runs per experiment, and several
types of result data are provided for each run. During a single run of the CoEA, the best
Attacker Solution and Defender Solution are stored from each generation. After the run is
complete, all the best solutions are output to file and used to generate a CIAO plot (Current
Individual vs. Ancestral Opponents), which is used to visually convey the progress of two
populations during coevolution [12]. The Defender Machine configuration is also output
to provide contextual information if needed during analysis.
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Table 1.3. Experiment Configuration Parameters







X1 Weak Weak Static Static
X2 Weak Weak Static Dynamic
X3 Weak Weak Dynamic Static
X4 Weak Weak Dynamic Dynamic
X5 Weak Strong Static Static
X6 Weak Strong Static Dynamic
X7 Weak Strong Dynamic Static
X8 Weak Strong Dynamic Dynamic
X9 Strong Weak Static Static
X10 Strong Weak Static Dynamic
X11 Strong Weak Dynamic Static
X12 Strong Weak Dynamic Dynamic
X13 Strong Strong Static Static
X14 Strong Strong Static Dynamic
X15 Strong Strong Dynamic Static
X16 Strong Strong Dynamic Dynamic
To briefly explain CIAO plots, an example is provided in Fig. 1.6. This particular
plot is from the attacker’s perspective in experiment X8. For this perspective, darker regions
indicate more success for the attacker, and the attacker’s generation is plotted along the
increasing y-axis while the defender’s generation is plotted along the increasing x-axis.
If this were the defender’s perspective, darker regions would indicate more success for
the defender, and the defender’s generation would be plotted along the increasing y-axis
while the attacker’s generation would be along the increasing x-axis. In this CIAO plot, the
attacker is most effective towards the last of its generations against the earliest generations
of defenders as indicated by the nearly black pixels.
4.3. Important Configuration Parameters. All experiments ran with certain
fixed values defined in the configuration, and this section will examine those values.
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Figure 1.6. Example CIAO Plot
• 30 CoEA Runs
This specifies the number of times a full CoEA is run per experiment. 30 CoEAs will
result in 60 different CIAO plots (one each for attacker and defender perspective).
This means that outliers can be identified, but when discussing results, we chose a
representative pair of plots for each experiment.
• 10 Defender Machines
This specifies how many machines the Defender has running on their network.
• 10 Fitness Opponents
This is the number of opponents used to evaluate a given population member for
fitness.
• 5 Simulation Runs
This is the number of simulation runs between any two opponents during fitness
evaluation. With 10 fitness opponents, this means that 50 simulation runs are needed
to evaluate any population member.
• 100 Generations per CoEA
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• Attacker Population Size of 100
• Defender Population Size of 100
• 30 Parents
This is the number of parents selected from each population per generation, and each
pair of parents produces a single offspring (i.e., 15 offspring for each population).
• Random Parent Selection
• Truncation Survivor Selection
• No Pre-Defined Defender Machines
This is used to specify a Defender Machine configuration for the network security
simulation. Since one is not given, the program will generate a random set of De-
fender Machines for the duration of each CoEA.
Many of these constants were chosen to meet time constraints in the experiments
or to simplify the model, though there are a few exceptions. Random parent selection was
chosen to add genetic variety to the offspring, and using truncation for survivor selection
ensured that the population would attempt to improve over time, or at least not throw away
the best solutions. There were never any pre-defined settings for the Defender Machines
aside from the total number, as this forced solutions to be robust enough to succeed against
multiple network configurations.
4.4. Population Seeds. Both of the initial populations were generated using ei-
ther strong or weak solutions for each experiment. The design of each population seed is
presented here.
4.4.1. Weak Attacker Seed. The weak attacker solution has only three out of ten
possible targets and zero recon techniques or exploits. All useful capabilities must be
developed through mutation.
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4.4.2. Strong Attacker Seed. The strong attacker solution has all ten defender
machines as targets, one recon technique for each possible effect, and an exploit with the
highest possible multiplier for the current configuration. All techniques have a success rate
of 100 percent. While not a perfect solution, this provides the attacker with a powerful set
of starting capabilities.
4.4.3. Weak Defender Seed. The weak defender solution starts both shutdown
thresholds at 1.0 (the highest level), which means that the defender will wait the longest
possible time before shutting down machines despite detecting exploits and data exfiltration
many times. Only three out of ten machines are listed as suspected targets, and there are
no detection systems or dynamic mitigation techniques. Like the weak attacker seed, all
useful capabilities must be developed through mutation.
4.4.4. Strong Defender Seed. The strong defender solution starts both shutdown
thresholds at 0.5, which is meant to strike a balance between increasing security and mini-
mizing productivity losses from having to shut down machines. It also has a cheap detection
system with perfect detection rates against all recon techniques and exploits, and it has an
even cheaper mitigation technique with a success rate of 100 percent. All ten machines are
listed as suspected targets. This provides a nearly perfect defense.
5. RESULTS
Typical CIAO plots for each experiment are shown in Tables 1.4 and 1.5. The
reason for having CIAO plots with both the attacker and defender perspectives is because
each population uses a slightly different fitness function (as explained in Subsection 3.2).
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5.1. Entirely White or Black CIAO Plots. CIAO plots are entirely white or black
for ten experiments, indicating that little or no evolution occurred. The following is an
examination of these cases.
5.1.1. X1, X5, X9, and X13. These are experiments where both populations were
static (no evolution was allowed to occur), so this behavior is entirely expected.
5.1.2. X2, X6, and X14. These are experiments with a static attacker and dynamic
defender. In X2, both sides start with weak population seeds. Since the weak attacker
essentially starts out with zero attack capabilities, there is no motivation for the defender
to evolve. In X6, the defender is strong while the attacker is still weak, so the same thing
happens. In X14, both sides start out strong, and this leads to a different problem: If both
sides are currently near their peak capabilities, there is little room to improve via evolution.
5.1.3. X7 and X15. These are experiments with a dynamic attacker and static de-
fender. In X7, the attacker starts out weak while the defender starts out strong. While this
provides plenty of room for the attacker to evolve, the defender was simply too power-
ful. The attacker never managed to evolve stronger capabilities since it could never gain a
foothold in the defender’s network. In X15, both sides start out strong, so neither has room
to evolve past their peak capabilities.
5.1.4. X16. In this experiment, both populations were dynamic and started out
strong. However, since both started near their peak, there was no room to evolve for their
best members.
5.2. Gradient CIAO Plots. CIAO plots have gradients for six experiments, indi-
cating that evolution occurred for one or both sides. The following is an examination of
these cases.
5.2.1. X3 and X11. These are experiments with a dynamic attacker and static de-
fender. In X3, both sides start out weak, which allows the attacker to evolve many new
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Table 1.4. Typical Resulting CIAO Plots (Attacker Perspective)
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8
X9 X10 X11 X12 X13 X14 X15 X16
Table 1.5. Typical Resulting CIAO Plots (Defender Perspective)
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8
X9 X10 X11 X12 X13 X14 X15 X16
capabilities and produce a smooth gradient in the corresponding CIAO plots. In X11, at-
tackers started out strong while defenders started out weak. As a result, the attacker’s best
members only evolved a few times since they were already strong. This created CIAO plots
with a few large bands in the gradient. In both cases, these CIAO plots show clear evolution
by the attacker.
5.2.2. X10. In this experiment, the defender was dynamic and started out weak
while the attacker was static and started out strong. Because of the attacker’s strength, the
defender had an incentive to evolve better capabilities, and since the defender started out
weak, it had a lot of room to evolve. Also, the attacker being static made it easier for the
defender to improve since it was not chasing a moving target. This led to a smooth gradient
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in the corresponding CIAO plots representing the clearest evolution by the defender in all
experiments.
5.2.3. X4, X8, and X12. These are experiments where both populations were dy-
namic. In X4, both populations started out weak, which leads to a lot of evolution on both
sides. This experiment’s CIAO plots show the attacker doing better against earlier defend-
ers, whereas the later defenders eventually became strong enough that the attackers had
trouble keeping up.
In X8, the attacker started out weak while the defender started out strong. The
attacker managed to evolve enough to do better against earlier opponents, though against
the defenders compensated for this by the end of the CoEA. Interestingly, the defender’s
CIAO plot in X8 is mostly black since the defender was doing well nearly the entire time
according to its own fitness estimates.
In X12, the attacker started out strong while the defender started out weak. In the
attacker’s CIAO plot, it is clear that the attacker was getting weaker over time according
to its own fitness estimates. This is because it started out strong while the defender was
weak, meaning that the attacker did not have much room to evolve and was also chasing a
moving target. The defender’s CIAO plot for X12 has mixed gradients, which means that
the attacker was at least attempting to counter the defender’s evolution. However, it still
shows that the defender eventually evolved to do well against almost all the attackers.
5.3. Outlier CIAO Plots. There were a few outlier CIAO plots for experiments
X14 and X16, and examples of them are displayed in Table 1.6. In both experiments, each
side starts out with a strong population seed, though the attacker is static for X14 while the
defender is dynamic in both experiments. The CoEA starts out with the attackers doing
decently well early on, but then they are clearly dominated by all later defender solutions.
This is consistent with other CIAO plots for X14 and X16 in the sense that little evolution
39
seems to occur, at least after a certain point. With little room for improvement, it appears
that the defender will always dominate due to a nearly perfect defense.
6. DISCUSSION
The results show that coevolution can be used to explore strategies by both attackers
and defenders in network security, but there are still several opportunities for improvement.
First, we chose to develop our own network security simulation as a compromise between
a purely mathematical model and real world testing. Unfortunately, there seem to be few
realistic simulations with the capabilities to test different types of cyber attacks. This is
an important point since both the scenarios and strategies need to map accurately to real
world entities. With our current simulation, it is possible to connect individual components
in solutions to offensive and defensive capabilities in modern networks, but it will likely be
an inaccurate or inconsistent mapping.
Second, the attacker and defender solutions mostly contained capabilities and a few
important thresholds. The fundamental strategy for both sides does not change according
to the solutions. Attackers always attempt to maximize their own profit by attacking a
specific list of targets with all reconnaissance techniques and exploits available to them.
Exploits will only be ignored for a given target if reconnaissance on that target has shown
it to violate the exploit’s own constraints (e.g. cannot use a SQL exploit if that service does
not exist on the target). Defenders only respond to attacks rather than taking independent
actions, and beyond detection and mitigation techniques, their only available option for
stopping attacks is to shut down machines entirely.
Third, there are a number of parameter combinations that can affect the simulation
or CoEA in interesting ways. One can change the number of defender machines, the num-
ber of generations, parent and survivor selection methods, the fitness function for either
40
Table 1.6. Outlier CIAO Plots
X14 Attacker X14 Defender
X16 Attacker X16 Defender
side, population sizes, etc. So far only limited hand tuning has been performed, due to the
high computational cost of running experiments.
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The goal of this work is to demonstrate the viability of developing cyber defense
strategies by applying coevolution to network security simulations. We created our own
simulation to test attacker and defender capabilities since existing frameworks did not meet
our needs, and the results have shown that coevolution is a capable model in this solution
space. In particular, experiments X3, X7, X11, and X15 are significant since they reflect
the current situation in cyber security. This is because they model a dynamic attacker and
static defender, an accurate situation as a defender will typically deploy defenses once and
rarely change them while attackers constantly update their capabilities.
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Note that our project is designed as a proof of concept. The network simulation in
CANDLES is purposely somewhat abstract for the sake of simplicity. By utilizing coevo-
lution with a more accurate simulation, it is likely that solutions with a stronger mapping
to real world systems would emerge. Therefore, in future work, the first priority is to in-
crease the fidelity of the simulation, such as introducing the notion of time (currently the
simulation only recognizes order). Another important goal would be to develop more of
the general strategy and less of the capabilities for attackers and defenders, as this could
lead to more dynamic behavior on both sides. Finally, an extensive sensitivity study needs
to be performed for identifying high-quality CoEA and simulation parameters.
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ABSTRACT
Predicting an adversary’s capabilities, intentions, and probable vectors of attack is
in general a complex and arduous task. Cyber space is particularly vulnerable to unforeseen
attacks, as most computer networks have a large, complex, opaque attack surface area and
are therefore extremely difficult to analyze. Abstract adversarial models which capture
the pertinent features needed for analysis can reduce the complexity sufficiently to make
analysis feasible. Game theory allows for mathematical analysis of adversarial models;
however, its scalability limitations restrict its use to simple, abstract models. Computational
game theory is focused on scaling classical game theory to large, complex systems capable
of modeling real-world environments; one promising approach is coevolution where each
player’s fitness is dependent on its adversaries. In this paper, we propose CANDLES v2,
a framework designed to coevolve attacker and defender agent strategies for enterprise
computer networks. We utilize a custom hill climber algorithm to determine the modality
and complexity of the search space, and a coevolutionary algorithm is employed to find
near-optimal strategies for both attackers and defenders. By performing both quantitative
1This is a significantly extended version of the authors’ SECDEF2015 workshop paper [1].
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and qualitative analysis of the result data, we provide a proof of concept for the applicability
of coevolution in planning for, and defending against, novel attacker strategies in computer
network security.
1. INTRODUCTION
Great strides are needed in the defensive tools and technologies available to cy-
ber security practitioners, as the asymmetric nature of cyber warfare [2] puts defending
practitioners at a distinct disadvantage; i.e., cyber attackers get to decide when and where
to attack, without the need for physical presence providing advance notice to the cyber
defenders who must scramble to quickly determine that an attack is occurring, select an
appropriate defense, and execute it. In cyber security, as in many security-related fields, it
can be prudent to evaluate worst-case attack scenarios. Whether facing insider threats or
sophisticated adversaries outside one’s networks, it is important to develop threat and at-
tack models such that one can predict an adversary’s capabilities, intentions, and probable
vectors of attack. Cyber space is particularly vulnerable to unforseen attacks due to most
computer networks having a large, complex, opaque attack surface area and therefore being
extremely difficult to analyze. Invariably, the large number of variables involved in both
offensive and defensive strategies makes an exhaustive search of all strategies infeasible.
Abstract adversarial models which capture the pertinent features needed to analyze such
strategies, can reduce the complexity sufficiently to make analysis feasible.
Game theory allows for mathematical analysis of adversarial models; however, its
scalability limitations restrict its use to simple, abstract models. Computational game the-
ory is focused on scaling classical game theory to large, complex systems capable of mod-
eling real-world environments; one promising approach is coevolution where each player’s
fitness is dependent on its adversaries. Coevolution can be employed to explore the as-
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sociated search spaces, examining strategic capabilities and estimating how each side will
adapt in response to moves made by an opponent.
It makes sense to focus resources on securing systems such that attacks become
less effective. There are several well-known ways to harden systems against attack, from
limiting access permissions to patching software and reducing exposed network services.
These are useful measures to reduce the attack surface and make it easier to defend vital
assets. Yet for all the efforts taken to secure systems, intrusions still occur in many or-
ganizations, often without their knowledge [2]. Once it is acknowledged that intrusions
cannot be stopped entirely, awareness, damage mitigation, and disaster recovery become
important goals. In particular, knowing how an adversary could break into a network and
devising possible counter-strategies is vital. In this paper, we propose CANDLES v2, a
framework designed to coevolve attacker and defender agent strategies for enterprise com-
puter networks. Our approach coevolves two populations containing attacker and defender
strategies in a network defense scenario, and the fitness of strategies is determined through
a custom, abstract simulation. In this way, unique, near-optimal strategies for both sides
can be discovered.
In our framework, attacker strategies focus on what action to take in a given turn
based upon available state information. Example actions might include discovering neigh-
bors, connecting to other machines, and launching exploits. Example state information
might include recent action history or the number of uncompromised neighbors. Defender
strategies are more static, focusing on changes made to the network at the beginning of a
simulation. These changes can include adding or removing network connections, adding
intrusion prevention systems (IPSs), and fortifying individual machines. This models real
world capabilities in that defenders tend to make changes periodically and rarely update
them, but attackers take a more active approach that requires more immediate information
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to be available. This design is intended to make the simulations more realistic and provide
greater insight into attacker and defender behavior.
We have also implemented a custom hill climber algorithm which is used to deter-
mine the modality and complexity of the search space for attacker and defender strategies.
By showing that the search space is multimodal and has high variation, we justify the use
of evolutionary algorithms to explore possible solutions.
By performing both quantitative and qualitative analysis of the result data, we pro-
vide a proof of concept for the applicability of coevolution in planning for, and defending
against, novel worst-case attacker strategies in computer network security, allowing an end
user to develop strategies and set up test scenarios. This offers new possibilities for analyz-
ing and reinforcing defensive capabilities against unknown threats.
2. RELATED WORK
Coevolution has been used to find better placements for Flexible AC Transmission
System (FACTS) devices [3], which are used to prevent cascading blackouts in electric
transmission systems [4], and also to evolve attackers and defenders for graph-based net-
work theory models [5]. Co-optimization has also been used to generalize coevolution in
such a way that it can be used with other black-box function optimization techniques [6],
and we used co-optimization to construct our custom hill climber algorithm as discussed
in Subsection 3.10. Defenses have been designed that can predict the behavior of adaptive
adversaries using a combination of game theory and machine learning [7], and machine
learning has likewise been used to predict the nature of relationships in adversarial social
networks [8]. Strategies have been developed for defending against Distributed Denial-
of-Service (DDoS) attacks using a Bayesian game theoretic framework [9], and hidden
Markov models have been developed to detect cyber attacks in network traffic [10]. Pareto
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optimization with Vulnerability Dependency Graphs (VDGs) has been used to simultane-
ously maximize productivity and minimize patching costs in enterprise networks [11]. A
previous version of the CANDLES framework was used to coevolve strategies for attackers
and defenders in computer networks, though it focused on evolution of both strategy and
available capabilities rather than pure strategy [1].
Current approaches to developing computer network defense strategies largely fo-
cus on either pure game theoretic models [12, 13] or real world implementations and em-
ulated systems [14, 15]. Emulated systems more accurately reflect real world conditions,
but require a fair amount of resources and configuration knowledge. Game theoretic mod-
els are mathematically elegant, but they do not scale well to larger search spaces. Our
approach falls somewhere in the middle, as our experiments employ a custom network se-
curity simulation. Coevolution allows us to approximate game theory solutions for large
search spaces, thus providing scalability beyond the limits of classic game theory, and the
simulation provides a more realistic strategy evaluation without the configuration difficulty
of most emulated systems.
3. METHODOLOGY
The two primary components of the CANDLES framework are: (a) a network secu-
rity simulation which quantifies the quality of attacker and defender solutions, thus creating
a search gradient giving rise to a graduated search space, and (b) an optimization algorithm
to search that graduated space of attacker and defender solutions for (sub)optimal solutions.
We investigated two optimization algorithms: a hill climber for the initial exploration of
the search space which revealed multimodality, thus justifying a more computationally ex-
pensive, but also more powerful, second algorithm, namely a CoEvolutionary Algorithm
(CoEA) to represent the natural dynamics between attackers and defenders in cyber space.
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A custom network security simulation is used to evaluate potential solutions for
both the CoEA and hill climber. Attackers and defenders only change their strategies for
the simulation rather than available capabilities, a purposeful constraint. The reason is that
by focusing on keeping capabilities static, each side is forced to make strategic trade-offs
which provide more interesting and realistic observations.
As attacker and defender strategies are used by everything else in CANDLES, those
will be covered in more detail first, followed by the attacker and defender classes since
they utilize strategies. Then the CoEA, hill climber, and network security simulation will
be discussed.
3.1. Attacker Strategy. An attacker strategy is represented by a binary decision
tree. Each internal node stores a condition which can evaluate to true or false, and based on
how that condition evaluates, a path is chosen to traverse down the tree. Each leaf node has
an action to be executed if it is reached. The attacker can only execute one action per turn.
All conditions and actions that an attacker strategy can use are listed in Tables 1.7 and 1.8.
Any attacker strategy can be translated as fully executable Python code, and an
example is shown in Fig. 1.7. One can see multiple places in this example where code is
either unreachable or reaches the same action no matter how a condition evaluates. This
is allowed in order to preserve genetic diversity since correcting or optimizing attacker
strategies might remove code which is useful when recombined with other strategies.
3.2. Defender Strategy. A defender strategy first requires the creation of a net-
work template. This network template includes all defender machines (nodes) and any
connections between them (edges). Based on changes to this template, the defender strat-
egy is defined by four item sets:
• Edges to add
• Edges to remove
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Table 1.7. Attacker Conditions
Variable Operators Possible Values
Uniform Random Value
From [0.0, 1.0]







<=, > Value From [1, (Number
Of Defender Machines)]
Previous Action == Any Attacker Action
Table 1.8. Attacker Actions
Action Description
Discover Exploit Generates a new random exploit. This is useful if the attacker has no
exploits that work on a given target.
Discover
Neighbors
Adds neighboring machines to the discovered network. This does




Attempt to connect to a random machine in the network. This may
fail if the discovered network is outdated.
Launch Exploit Attempts to compromise neighboring machine. This may fail if the
discovered network is outdated, if an intrusion prevention system
(IPS) blocks the scan, or if the target node is resistant to attack due
to being fortified by the defender.
Scan Neighbor Scan neighboring machine for reconnaissance information. Like ex-
ploits, target scans may fail if the discovered network is outdated, if
an IPS blocks the scan, or if the target node is resistant to attack.
Search Local
Machine
Extract value from the current machine. The amount of value ex-
tracted depends on the configuration.
Wait Do nothing this turn. This is useful for letting defender paranoia
decrease over time.
• Edges with intrusion prevention systems (IPSs)
• Machines to harden against attack
Adding and removing edges changes the network connectivity. Adding IPSs to
various edges allows the defender to block exploits and scans, as well as raise paranoia
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if 'jumpToRandomNode' in self.previousAction:
if self.discoveredNetwork.number_of_nodes() > 13:





if random.uniform(0.0, 1.0) > 0.815565908109849:
self.discoverNeighbors()
else:





if 'discoverNeighbors' in self.previousAction:









Figure 1.7. Example Attacker Strategy
depending on what is detected. Paranoia is covered further in Subsection 3.4. Hardening
machines makes it less likely that attacks of any kind will succeed against specific targets.
An example defender strategy is shown in Fig. 1.8. Defender machines are repre-
sented by their numeric IDs, and edges are represented as tuples of IDs. Note that edges
to remove are not listed here. Since the default network template starts with zero edges,
removing edges would not make sense in this context.
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33 edges to add: (0, 0), (0, 7), (1, 8), (1, 16), (1, 17), (2, 12), (2,
14), (3, 4), (3, 8), (3, 11), (3, 13), (5, 5), (5, 9), (5, 18), (6,
9), (6, 12), (6, 13), (6, 17), (6, 18), (6, 19), (7, 15), (9, 19),
(10, 10), (10, 13), (10, 14), (11, 12), (11, 15), (11, 19), (13, 15),
(14, 19), (15, 15), (15, 18), (15, 19)
2 edges with an IPS: (0, 0), (10, 18)
4 machines to fortify: 6, 7, 13, 15
Figure 1.8. Example Defender Strategy
3.3. Attacker. The attacker stores state information and executes actions during a






• Previous action information
The attacker strategy is described in Subsection 3.1. Exploits only specify the constraints
necessary for successful execution, which is important to note since all exploits have the
same probability of success once their constraints are met. The discovered network repre-
sents an attacker’s understanding of the defender’s network, and it can change according
to the results of neighbor discovery and machine scans. The discovered network may also
need to be corrected periodically since the defender is capable of shutting down machines
during the simulation, which can disrupt other actions by the attacker. The connection trace
represents the attacker’s current path through the defender network, which is useful in case
a machine is shut down which is in the attacker’s path. The attacker’s most recent action is
stored as state knowledge for attacker strategies.
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3.4. Defender. The defender sets up the network before the simulation begins, so
much of the defensive strategy is passive. However, the defender can shut down machines
during the simulation if paranoia reaches certain thresholds. To accomplish this, the de-




The defender strategy is described in Subsection 3.2. Paranoia indicates how nervous the
defender is based on detected scans or attacks. Attack history stores the source, destination,
and type of any detected attacks.
3.5. Network Security Simulation. The network security simulation consists of
two phases: preparation and active. Both are discussed below, as well as the data returned
from each run of the simulation.
3.5.1. Preparation Phase. During this phase, variables are initialized and config-
ured as necessary. The network template is copied to allow modifications, and the attacker’s
starting location is chosen based on the current configuration. By default, the attacker will
start from a perimeter node connected to the Internet, as this is meant to simulate an attack
from an external source. Default exploits are generated for the attacker, and both the at-
tacker and defender are initialized with their respective strategies. The defender then sets
up passive defenses across the network. These include adding and removing connections,
adding intrusion prevention systems, and hardening machines against attack.
3.5.2. Active Phase. The active phase consists of an event loop that runs for a set
number of iterations, essentially turns. There are four steps to each turn:
1. Attacker action
2. Defender paranoia checks
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3. Defender paranoia decay
4. Productivity loss calculation
Each turn, the attacker will take the action determined by its current strategy (as described
in Subsections 3.1 and 3.3). Next the defender will check its paranoia level, and if the
machine shutdown threshold is met, it will find the most recent detected attack involving
currently active machines and shut them down. This includes both the attack source, be-
cause it is compromised, and the target, to prevent further compromise. Then the defender
will decay its paranoia, reducing it according to some value specified in the configuration.
Note that paranoia can never drop below zero. Finally, the defender calculates produc-
tivity loss due to machines that have been shut down or disconnected from the Internet.
Since only one node in the network connects to the defender’s Internet service provider,
all machines must be active and have a valid path to that node in order to have Internet
connectivity.
3.5.3. Return Values. Two values and one object are returned from any run of the
simulation:
• Total attacker profit
• Total defender cost
• Final network
The total attacker profit includes all value that the attacker extracted by searching compro-
mised machines. In this case, extracting value from compromised machines represents the
theft of data from an opponent’s network. Since there are diminishing returns for searching
the same machine multiple times, this encourages the attacker to compromise more ma-
chines. At the same time, compromising more machines means taking actions that make
the attacker more noticeable. This can raise defender paranoia and make it more likely that
compromised machines will be shut down.
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The total defender cost includes all productivity losses from every turn of the simu-
lation. A defender has an incentive to shut down compromised machines in order to prevent
further compromise or data theft. However, productivity loss is the trade-off since inactive
machines are useless. Also, an inactive machine cannot transfer data, so any path through
it to the Internet is no longer valid. This means that shutting down one machine can poten-
tially disconnect many others, leading to massive productivity loss for the remainder of the
simulation.
The final network is the defender network along with all of its state information
at the end of the simulation. This data is used to draw an image of the network, creating
a visual representation of all nodes and edges. Specific colors and notation are used for
relevant network features as covered in Subsection 3.6.
3.6. Network Graph Visualizations. Network graph visualizations are used to
represent networks either before modification by attackers and defenders or at the end of a
network security simulation to show the final result. An example network graph visualiza-
tion from the end of a simulation is shown in Fig. 1.9. Several properties are used to make
the graph easier to interpret, and color is one of the most important. All nodes start out blue
by default, and compromised nodes are red. The perimeter node connected to the Internet
is initially lime green, though since the attacker’s starting node is orange and takes a higher
priority, the perimeter node will typically be orange unless the configuration specifies a
different starting point for the attacker. Finally, nodes which are inactive due to being shut
down are black.
A few properties are useful besides color. Fortified nodes are larger at roughly twice
the diameter of unfortified nodes, and edges containing an IPS are drawn bold (greater edge
width).
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Figure 1.9. Example Network Graph Visualization
3.7. Fitness Function. The fitness function is asymmetric, with the attacker min-
imizing one fitness value while the defender maximizes another fitness value. Attacker
profit is an abstract representation of the amount of data that attackers are able to exfiltrate
after searching compromised machines. Since attacker profit is good for attackers and bad
for defenders, both sides take it into account. Without parsimony pressure, attacker strate-
gies were getting too large and difficult to analyze. Applying parsimony pressure made
the resulting attacker strategies smaller and easier to understand while still allowing more
effective strategies to thrive. Also, since all defenders have the same resources available,
defender costs are represented by productivity loss as described in Subsection 3.5.3. The
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fitness values are calculated as shown in Equations (1.5), (1.6), and (1.7).
attacker f itness =−(attacker pro f it)+(attacker parsimony) (1.5)
attacker parsimony = (parsimony weight)∗ (attacker tree size) (1.6)
de f ender f itness =−(attacker pro f it)− (de f ender costs) (1.7)
Fitness is determined on a scale of (−∞,0]. Defenders attempt to maximize their fitness
value since having zero losses from data theft and zero defender costs is the best case sce-
nario. Attackers want to have as large a profit as possible, and they attempt to minimize
their fitness value so that the attacker profit can be represented the same way in both equa-
tions.
3.8. Investigating the Search Space. A custom hill climber algorithm has been
employed to determine the modality and complexity of the search space. The hill climber
implementation is described in Subsection 3.10, and a nested version of it is described in
Subsection 3.11. Results from its application are shown in Section 5 and are later discussed
in Subsection 6.2. To briefly summarize the results, there is a high standard deviation in
both the number of iterations and final fitness values for hill climber runs across nearly all
experimental configurations. This includes testing against both dynamic and static oppo-
nents, since the search space is essentially a moving target for each side when both oppo-
nents are dynamic. From these results, the search space is determined to be multimodal
with a high level of complexity. Due to this, coevolution can be used to effectively search
for near-optimal solutions.
3.9. Coevolutionary Algorithm. The CoEA evolves a population of attacker
strategies against a population of defender strategies using the methods described below.
3.9.1. Parent and Survivor Selection. Parent and survivor selection can be ran-
dom or utilize truncation. By default, parent selection is random, and survivor selection
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utilizes truncation. This ensures that the best population members are never discarded, but
genetic variety is still introduced into offspring. However, these values are also manipu-
lated as experimental variables.
3.9.2. Attacker Recombination. Attacker recombination uses subtree swapping.
The subtree root nodes are selected randomly from two attacker decision trees, which
means that subtrees of different sizes may be swapped. This makes it possible to grow
or shrink the size of the recombined decision trees, leading to greater variety in the pos-
sible solutions. It also helps keep strategic components intact, making it more likely that
useful genetic data will be introduced in the resulting offspring. Although this technique
creates two resulting trees with swapped data, only one is randomly chosen and returned
from the function.
3.9.3. Attacker Mutation. Attacker mutation selects a random node from the at-
tacker decision tree and randomizes the data in that node. The randomization will not
change whether the node is a condition or action since that could break the decision tree.
It will instead generate a new condition or action as appropriate and assign it to the node.
Note that multiple nodes may be randomized per mutation as determined by the relevant
config value.
3.9.4. Defender Recombination. Defender strategies are composed of sets. To
create a new offspring, two parents are chosen, and the union of each of their variables is
used to create a pool of new values. From these values, a new random subset is chosen
for each variable. For network connections being added and removed, the set size can
change in the offspring. However, the set size is kept constant for edges to receive intrusion
prevention systems and machines to harden against attack. This is because having a larger
subset of IPSs and hardened machines would give offspring an unreasonable advantage.
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3.9.5. Defender Mutation. To begin, one of the sets composing the defender strat-
egy is randomly chosen for mutation. If the sets are the network connections to be added or
removed, then edges may be randomly added or removed from those sets. If the sets are for
intrusion prevention systems or hardened machines, then one item in the set is randomly
chosen and replaced. Note that multiple changes can occur per mutation as determined by
the relevant config value.
3.10. Hill Climber. Our hill climbing algorithm is a variation of first-choice hill
climbing, in which successors are generated randomly until an improvement on the cur-
rent state is found [16]. Our algorithm also uses co-optimization since both attackers and
defenders require at least one opponent to be evaluated for fitness [6].
The hill climber begins each run by randomly generating a network template, de-
fender strategy, and attacker strategy. Depending on the configuration, the algorithm will
then attempt to improve either or both strategies until no further improvements can be made
(i.e., climbing the hill). By default, both strategies are improved simultaneously.
Due to the stochastic nature of the network security simulation, it is not possible
to say with certainty that one solution is statistically better than another without many
computationally intensive calculations. Also, it would be infeasible to test every possible
change to a specific strategy. To improve efficiency, the algorithm will only attempt to
improve a solution 100 consecutive times before giving up during any iteration. However, it
is possible that the attacker may improve for several iterations before the defender improves
in a later iteration, or vice versa. During a run in which both sides are dynamic, it only
terminates when neither side improves during an iteration. This is necessary since the
fitness landscape changes with any improvement to either side, requiring the evaluation of
both candidates even if only one side has improved in the previous iteration.
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Likewise to improve efficiency, rather than attempt every possible change to a so-
lution, possible improvements are found by performing random mutations using the same
operators as the CoEA. This is because in some cases it would be more computationally
intensive to compute all possible changes than to attempt 100 random mutations. The rele-
vant mutation operators are described in Subsections 3.9.3 and 3.9.5.
3.11. Nested Hill Climber. The nested hill climber is an extension of our hill
climbing algorithm in which 30 static opponents are tested against random individuals
over 30 runs. Since the static opponents do not change, this provides a constant fitness
landscape. Evaluating the search space becomes much easier as a result. It is referred to
as ‘nested’ because the original hill climber is nested inside multiple loops to accomplish
this.
4. EXPERIMENT PROCEDURE
The objective of our experiments is to use coevolution and hill climbing to explore
and evaluate strategies in a cyber defense simulation. The hill climber is also used to
determine the modality and complexity of the search space, justifying the use of a CoEA.
4.1. Experiment Variables. The experiment variables are configuration parame-
ters. Several parameters are tested with multiple values for both the hill climber and CoEA
algorithms, though there are a few exceptions in which a parameter only affects the CoEA.
Each parameter with corresponding values is listed here, and each value has its experiment
ID listed in parentheses:
• Attacker Parsimony Pressure
0 (X1), 0.5 (X2), 1 (X3)
• Attacker Starting Node
perimeter (X4), random (X5)
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• Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) Ratio
0.1 (X6), 0.25 (X7), 0.5 (X8)
• Machine Shutdown Threshold
0.01 (X9), 0.1 (X10), 1.0 (X11)
• Network Topology
linear (X12), random (X13), ring (X14), star (X15), tree (X16), and zero connectivity
(X17)
• Parent Selection (CoEA Only)
random (X18), truncation (X19)
• Productivity Loss Multiplier
0 (X20), 0.5 (X21), 1 (X22)
• Survivor Selection (CoEA Only)
random (X23), truncation (X24)
Only one configuration parameter is tested at a time, and all other parameters use a
set of default values. The only difference between the default values for the hill climber and
CoEA is that the former tests fitness against one opponent instead of five. This is because
only one opponent exists during the hill climber algorithm, rather than an entire opposing
population. The CoEA will instead perform random sampling against five opponents for
each individual being evaluated. Also, each experiment is run 30 times due to the stochastic
nature of both the algorithms and the network security simulation. This provides a sufficient
sample size for statistical analysis where appropriate.
4.2. Result Data Format – CoEA. During a single run of the CoEA, the best
attacker and defender strategies are stored for each generation. A network graph visual-
ization is output once at the beginning of each run before any changes are made, and one
is also output every ten generations in order to provide visual feedback of typical network
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defense simulations between the best strategies. After the run is complete, all the best
solutions are output to file and used to generate two CIAO plots (Current Individual vs.
Ancestral Opponents), which are used to visually convey the progress of two populations
during coevolution [17]. One CIAO plot shows the attacker perspective while the other
shows defender perspective, an important contrast since the fitness function is asymmetric.
To briefly explain CIAO plots, an example is provided in Fig. 1.10. Assume this
particular plot is from an attacker’s perspective. From this perspective, darker regions
indicate more success for the attacker, and the attacker’s generation is plotted along the
increasing y-axis while the defender’s generation is plotted along the increasing x-axis.
If this were the defender’s perspective, darker regions would indicate more success for
the defender, and the defender’s generation would be plotted along the increasing y-axis
while the attacker’s generation would be along the increasing x-axis. In this CIAO plot,
the attacker would be most effective towards the last of its generations against the earliest
generations of defenders as indicated by the nearly black pixels.
Figure 1.10. Example CIAO Plot
4.3. Result Data Format – Hill Climber. During a single run of the hill climber,
the final attacker and defender strategies are output to file. Fitness values for each iteration
63
are also output for each strategy, which provides a way to measure the fitness values and
number of iterations across one or more runs. A network graph visualization is output once
at the beginning of each run before any changes are made, and one is also output at the end
of each run to show the result of a typical network defense simulation between the final
strategies.
5. RESULTS
This section contains results from the experiments described in Section 4. Results
are organized by experimental variable and corresponding algorithm: the coevolutionary
algorithm (CoEA) or the hill climber (HC). The reason that the nested hill climber results
are not discussed in more detail is that they reflect similar results to the hill climber, and
their main purpose is to demonstrate variability in the final fitness values of hill climber
results, even when one side is kept static.
There are several result tables containing information organized by experiment ID.
Tables 1.9 and 1.10 show typical CIAO plots from the attacker and defender perspectives
for each CoEA experiment. Table 1.11 lists statistics for the number of iterations across
all 30 runs for each hill climber experiment. Tables 1.12 and 1.13 show statistics for the
final fitness values of strategies across all 30 runs for each nested hill climber experiment.
Table 1.12 is specific to experiments with static attackers while Table 1.13 is specific to
static defenders. However, since each nested hill climber tests 30 static opponents against
random opponents, statistics are first calculated per run (for each set of 30 static opponents)
and then averaged over all runs for that experiment ID.
5.1. Attacker Parsimony Pressure – CoEA (X1–X3). Attacker parsimony pres-
sure was a configuration parameter added to reduce attacker strategies down to a more
manageable size. At higher levels, the attacker did tend to evolve simpler strategies, but
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Table 1.9. Typical Resulting CIAO Plots (Attacker Perspective)
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8
X9 X10 X11 X12 X13 X14 X15 X16
X17 X18 X19 X20 X21 X22 X23 X24
Table 1.10. Typical Resulting CIAO Plots (Defender Perspective)
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8
X9 X10 X11 X12 X13 X14 X15 X16
X17 X18 X19 X20 X21 X22 X23 X24
there was also a noticeable effect with regards to stagnation. Particularly with zero parsi-
mony pressure, the attacker was a bit more free to try unusual strategies, even if that meant
making them larger. This meant that the attacker tended to get stuck more often when ap-
plying higher parsimony pressure, even though it made the strategies easier to understand.
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Table 1.11. Hill Climber Statistics for Number of Iterations
Experiment ID Median Average Standard
Deviation
X1 2.0 371.7 1248.2
X2 2.0 137.5 524.3
X3 2.0 701.0 2992.1
X4 2.0 5.1 13.1
X5 3798.5 6174.5 5918.6
X6 2.0 99.0 519.2
X7 2.0 690.0 3391.9
X8 2.0 548.5 1530.8
X9 2.0 501.3 1595.6
X10 2.0 293.0 1065.9
X11 2.0 418.7 1424.5
X12 1.0 411.7 1288.0
X13 2.0 242.7 635.2
X14 1.5 356.7 1081.6
X15 2.0 221.8 713.8
X16 2.0 314.6 1436.7
X17 2.0 326.5 1166.0
X18 n/a n/a n/a
X19 n/a n/a n/a
X20 1.5 59.5 307.6
X21 2.0 1042.2 4470.7
X22 2.0 651.4 2067.9
X23 n/a n/a n/a
X24 n/a n/a n/a
5.2. Attacker Parsimony Pressure – HC (X1–X3). For the hill climber, the at-
tacker did not perform significantly better or worse at any level of parsimony pressure.
However, this is a bit unfair to test with the hill climber. Since it changes strategies us-
ing the same mutation operator as the CoEA and recombination is never used, the attacker
strategy trees can never grow or shrink. As a result, parsimony pressure applies a uniform
penalty to all solutions, essentially having zero effect on the algorithm. Across all result
sets, the number of iterations was a median of two with a standard deviation over 500.
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What this seems to indicate is a wildly variable search space in which the ability to find
better solutions largely depends upon the starting points for each side. In visual terms,
the fitness landscape is probably flat in several places with large jagged mountains placed
intermittently. As it turns out, this search space topography persists throughout nearly all
other hill climber results.
5.3. Attacker Starting Node – CoEA (X4–X5). It was difficult to determine if the
attacker had an advantage when the starting node was random as opposed to starting from
the perimeter (attacking from the Internet). There were several runs for both configurations
where each side stagnated and made little, if any, progress. It is also interesting that both
sides had more variable fitness values when the attacker’s starting node was random, though
it makes sense as the advantage for each side would change from simulation to simulation,
making it harder to measure.
5.4. Attacker Starting Node – HC (X4–X5). This was one instance where the hill
climber’s results deviated strongly from the CoEA. The attacker completely dominated the
network when using a random starting node, whereas starting at the perimeter rarely yielded
any progress. One possible explanation is that having a random starting point allows the
attacker to test its strategy in more positions and therefore adapt faster. Another possibility
is that regardless of the attacker’s strategy, starting from many points in the network makes
it more likely that a well-positioned starting node will make the attacker appear to have a
better strategy when the starting point actually made the difference. Either way, this allows
the attacker to continue getting better for a longer period of time until it develops strong
strategies.
Another unusual point of this experiment involved the number of iterations across
results. For a starting node at the perimeter, the median number of iterations was 2.0 with a
standard deviation of 13.1. This indicates that almost no useful improvements were found
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Table 1.12. Nested Hill Climber Statistics for Final Fitness Values (Static Attacker)
Experiment ID Avg Median Avg Average Avg Standard
Deviation
X1 -6.6 -43.3 142.1
X2 -7.2 -59.4 236.3
X3 -9.0 -48.3 181.2
X4 -16.6 -58.0 169.4
X5 -10.6 -44.0 129.6
X6 -9.9 -59.2 212.7
X7 -10.1 -44.7 144.1
X8 -19.0 -58.6 159.8
X9 -17.2 -72.5 216.6
X10 -17.3 -55.1 159.0
X11 -14.1 -66.0 193.8
X12 -11.0 -17.6 34.7
X13 -7.4 -14.7 38.2
X14 -11.3 -12.1 4.3
X15 -16.7 -17.3 2.3
X16 -16.5 -16.6 4.1
X17 -3.9 -38.5 150.8
X18 n/a n/a n/a
X19 n/a n/a n/a
X20 -8.3 -8.2 0.5
X21 -6.2 -27.4 93.1
X22 -12.3 -56.7 187.9
X23 n/a n/a n/a
X24 n/a n/a n/a
for attacker solutions with a standard configuration starting from the perimeter. However,
for a random starting node, the median number of iterations was 3798.5 with a standard
deviation of 5918.6. This disparity between the results seems to support the notion that a
random starting node enables the attacker to progress more consistently over time.
5.5. IPS Ratio – CoEA (X6–X8). The IPS ratio indicates the number of intrusion
prevention systems to place in the network relative to the number of nodes. This parameter
seemed to make little difference in the CoEA at any level, and there were several runs in
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Table 1.13. Nested Hill Climber Statistics for Final Fitness Values (Static Defender)
Experiment ID Avg Median Avg Average Avg Standard
Deviation
X1 -56.3 -88.8 118.6
X2 -37.7 -63.9 99.0
X3 -39.2 -69.0 101.1
X4 -39.1 -73.5 109.1
X5 -74.9 -163.6 166.4
X6 -41.9 -71.6 99.0
X7 -41.6 -70.1 92.8
X8 -38.6 -65.4 97.8
X9 -30.1 -60.0 92.4
X10 -34.0 -68.9 109.7
X11 -40.7 -66.1 96.7
X12 -32.9 -57.1 100.6
X13 -34.0 -65.4 98.1
X14 -37.4 -70.9 112.6
X15 -40.8 -65.0 91.5
X16 -38.1 -65.5 97.0
X17 -33.5 -54.9 86.2
X18 n/a n/a n/a
X19 n/a n/a n/a
X20 -35.8 -62.4 89.6
X21 -26.1 -56.0 103.2
X22 -28.3 -52.4 89.5
X23 n/a n/a n/a
X24 n/a n/a n/a
which little or no evolution occurred. Since placing an IPS near the attacker’s starting point
can lead to shutting down at least the target (and therefore the network connection itself),
the defender has to be careful not to cut off the rest of the network. This usually leads to
the defender either placing the IPSs further from the Internet connection, or connecting the
Internet to the rest of the network by multiple edges to prevent cutting off all machines and
incurring massive productivity losses.
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5.6. IPS Ratio – HC (X6–X8). The IPS ratio seemed to make little difference at
any level, and the end result was similar to the CoEA. For all IPS ratio values, the number
of iterations across result sets was a median of two and a standard deviation over 500.
5.7. Machine Shutdown Threshold – CoEA (X9–X11). Machine shutdown
threshold seemed to have little effect on the CoEA. Overall it followed a similar pattern
as the placement of intrusion prevention systems, probably for much the same reason. Set-
ting the shutdown threshold too low makes it too easy to disconnect lots of machines from
the network and incur productivity losses.
5.8. Machine Shutdown Threshold – HC (X9–X11). The machine shutdown
threshold made little difference here, much like with the CoEA. For all machine shutdown
thresholds, the number of iterations across result sets was a median of two with a standard
deviation over 1000.
5.9. Network Topology – CoEA (X12–X17). For the linear topology, the de-
fender often did the best by changing none of the edges. Since all machines are connected
from the beginning, there is little point in adding new edges other than redundancy, and
removing edges would create a productivity loss. Also, by having machines connected in
a line, the attacker is forced to compromise each available machine consecutively in order
to reach any others. Despite this, attackers were often successful in compromising several
machines and exfiltrating data. This is probably because it is impossible to completely
isolate the attacker without cutting off large portions of the network.
The ring topology had similar results to the linear topology, which is unsurprising
considering the only difference in the ring is an extra edge from the starting point to the
other end of the network.
The star topology is designed to be the worst one for the defender. From the begin-
ning, every machine is accessible with only one hop from the starting node, and the starting
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node cannot be shut down since that would disconnect the entire network. Due to this, the
defender often reforms the network template in a completely different format to counter
attacker efforts. Sometimes this involves isolating the starting point, and in some cases the
resulting configuration ends up closer to a ring topology.
The tree topology yielded nothing particularly unusual. It is a relatively sparse
network, providing a smaller attack surface area than most random topologies, but still
providing more machines to attack at once than a linear or ring topology.
The zero connectivity model did surprisingly badly for the defender. While final so-
lutions tended to connect all nodes and prevent productivity loss, the attacker either evolved
well and took over most of the network or evolved barely at all. Once an attacker found a
working strategy, it tended to take over everything with little resistance from the defender.
This seems to indicate that it is best to start from a topology that keeps all machines con-
nected while providing the smallest possible attack surface.
The random network topology had mixed results, as expected from an unpredictable
starting configuration.
5.10. Network Topology – HC (X12–X17). Individual results for different net-
work topologies were roughly the same for the hill climber as the CoEA. The median num-
ber of hill climber iterations ranges from one to two depending on the network topology,
and the standard deviation is over 600 iterations for all result sets.
5.11. Parent Selection – CoEA (X18–X19). There was generally more evolution
on both sides when parent selection was random. This is expected since survivor selection
utilizes truncation by default, and parent selection has to be random in order to introduce
new genetic material.
5.12. Productivity Loss Multiplier – CoEA (X20–X22). When the productivity
loss multiplier was zero, there was little evolution for either side, but this was because the
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defender almost immediately found a winning strategy: disconnect all nodes. This can
be seen in the example CIAO plots for X20 where evolution stops halfway through the
run. Once the multiplier was increased to 0.5 and 1.0 respectively, resulting networks were
mostly connected. The multiplier 0.5 resulted in the best competition between both sides,
probably because the lower penalty allowed the defender to experiment a bit more with
changes to the network. Further changes by the defender stimulated more frequent changes
in attacker strategy, which then started a virtuous cycle of greater evolution for both sides.
5.13. Productivity Loss Multiplier – HC (X20–X22). There was a significant
difference between CoEA and hill climber results for a productivity loss multiplier of zero.
Several of the final networks for the hill climber were connected even though there was
no penalty for disconnecting all nodes. This is because while the CoEA allows both sides
plenty of time to find new improvements based on a set of randomized solutions, the hill
climber only has a single randomized solution per run for each side. If neither side can
mutate in a way that provides an improvement to performance, the hill climber will stop
after one iteration. This means that if the attacker could not improve with any single muta-
tion, then the defender had no advantage from removing edges and therefore no reason to
change anything.
The multiplier of zero also had the fewest iterations with a median of 1.5 per run and
a standard deviation of 307.6. The multipliers for 0.5 and 1.0 had a median of 2.0 iterations
with standard deviations of 4470.7 and 2067.9 respectively. As in other hill climber runs,
this demonstrates extreme variability in the search space.
5.14. Survivor Selection – CoEA (X23–X24). Using random survivor selection
led to an unusual striping effect in the CIAO plots for X23. Black, white, and gray horizon-
tal stripes alternate as solutions of different quality are found, lost, and discovered again
over multiple generations. For truncation, evolution is more consistent in the cases where
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evolution occurs at all. However, there are still instances in which little to no evolution
occurs due to a lack of real competition.
6. DISCUSSION
A few common patterns emerged among attacker and defender strategies. Defend-
ers often attempt to isolate the attacker source by placing several nodes in a line between
the source and the rest of the network. This forces the attacker to compromise each ma-
chine in turn to attack other parts of the network, a process called pivoting. Machines are
also reinforced more near the attacker source since they are more likely to be attacked.
Since the attacker is starting from the Internet, this strategy is a kind of perimeter defense.
Also, when placing an intrusion prevention system near the attacker source, it is common to
add multiple connections to prevent disconnecting the entire network in the case a detected
attack causes machines to be shut down. This reflects the real world conundrum of how to
block attacks from the Internet while still maintaining the connection for legitimate traffic.
Attacker strategies typically employed a variety of actions in order to deal with
different situations. All actions in Table 1.8 appeared at least some of the time. However,
one unusual result would occasionally appear in which the attacker would create a tree
with only a single action: to search the local machine. Since the attacker starts with only
one compromised node on any network, it was apparently easier in some cases to stay
in one place and scan for data. Since compromising other machines requires multiple
actions, coming up with a strategy to gain access to other machines can be somewhat tricky.
Searching the local machine is also the only direct way to extract value, so it is not entirely
unexpected that the attacker might choose to do this.
For attacker conditions, one of the most common was checking if the previous
action matched a given value. This indicates a strong need for context, which makes sense
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given that attacker actions work best when executed in a specific order. For example, one
might first scan a neighboring machine before launching an exploit, or jump to a random
compromised machine before searching locally for valuable data.
6.1. Coevolutionary Algorithm. The CoEA found several useful solutions, but
it also had the issue of evolving poorly in many cases for randomly initialized solutions.
Many randomly generated strategies were weak, which created little incentive for either
side to get stronger. In other cases, attackers improved quickly, but defenders never found
the right combination of changes to mitigate attacks. In general, needing fewer changes
made it easier for the defender to do well. This seems to indicate that the choice of network
template is important to the defender’s evolution and is especially apparent in the network
topology experiments, since defenders made the fewest changes to the best starting topolo-
gies: linear and ring. Those topologies tended to have some of the best evolution since
defenders were starting from a stronger position which made improvements easier to find,
and attackers had reason to develop better strategies against inherently stronger opponents.
6.2. Hill Climber. Overall the hill climber had a high standard deviation for the
number of iterations across all result sets. This indicates that the fitness landscape is flat in
many places with jagged mountains in between. Points in flat spaces represent strategies
that are essentially useless and require many changes to become helpful at all. For defend-
ers this could mean changing multiple edges, IPSs, or fortified machines, where attackers
may have several actions or conditions in their decision trees that need to be modified in
order to gain an advantage. In contrast, a point on a mountain or hill represents a decent
strategy that just needs to be optimized.
This process is further complicated by having a fitness landscape that changes de-
pending on the opponent. A strategy that is useful against one opponent may be ineffective
or even counterproductive against another opponent. This means that the fitness landscape
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itself shifts as the opponent changes, making a hill climber ineffective for testing robustness
of strategies against multiple opponents. A CoEA is better suited for that type of analysis
since it evolves a set of strategies for each side over multiple generations.
7. LIMITATIONS
CIAO plots are used to visually convey the progress of two populations during
coevolution [17]. While this is useful for quick visual analysis, comparison of two or more
CIAO plots is difficult from a statistical perspective. In particular, comparing the rate of
coevolution from different runs is difficult without examining all values, and as such, it
would be worthwhile to find methods of performing quantitative analysis on experimental
data using coevolution.
Experiments were also constrained by computational complexity due to the stochas-
tic nature of the network defense simulation. Introducing randomness made it possible to
simulate a probability of success for any action without understanding its underlying mech-
anism, but it also made it more difficult to accurately measure strategy fitness since it could
change from one simulation to another. The CoEA performed random sampling against
five opponents for each individual being evaluated, and results from each opponent were
averaged over five simulations. This meant that a single individual took 25 simulations
to evaluate, and it had to be evaluated multiple times since any change in one population
could change the fitness values for the other population. This raises the question of how
accurate a fitness estimate has to be in order to be useful. Reducing the number of required
simulations is desirable since it reduces experiment run time, but increasing the number of
simulations generates a clearer CIAO plot with less noise.
The matter is further complicated when considering outliers. Sometimes the ex-
treme cases are more interesting from a security point of view, since they represent either
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the worst or best case scenarios. Worst case scenarios might benefit from further evalua-
tion within our framework, though it is unclear how that would be accomplished without
involving human expertise.
The fidelity of the network representation is also important to consider when run-
ning these simulations. The network was represented by a graph and did not attempt to
simulate application protocols or even traffic rates across various edges. Instead it mostly
served to keep track of available connections and intrusion prevention systems, as well as
the status of defender machines. This abstraction kept the focus on features that were es-
sential to the analysis and reduced the complexity of implementation, but it did mean losing
the detail and accuracy obtained by emulating network traffic in a realistic way.
8. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This work has shown certain existing strategies in network security to be highly
effective. For defenders, perimeter security should be strong, and making pivoting more
difficult will mitigate the amount of damage that can be done in a given time span. For
attackers, it is best to have a diverse set of capabilities since both the opponent’s network
topology and machine characteristics can be diverse and unpredictable. Stealth is extremely
useful when possible since it avoids raising defender paranoia, making it easier to further
infiltrate the network and exfiltrate data.
No entirely new strategies were found using our simulations, though it is difficult
to say whether that is due to the design of the simulation or the nature of network security.
Adding more capabilities to both sides could lead to more interesting observations, if not
new strategies. As such, future work might include adding the capability for defenders to
deploy honeypots or host-based firewalls, as well as potentially simulating the behavior of
end users in an organization. For the attacker, it might make sense to test a scenario starting
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outside the network. Rather than starting with a single compromised machine and breaking
through internal defenses, perhaps an attacker could sneak in via a phishing attempt or
insider attack. Increasing the realism of both sides’ capabilities and tradeoffs might also be
helpful, such as allowing defenders to fortify more machines with a fixed cost or allowing
an attacker to encrypt network traffic to avoid detection.
Regarding our implemention of the coevolutionary algorithm, future work might
include switching to a multiobjective model. By doing this, one could more effectively
search for the best tradeoff between defense costs and attack mitigation for defenders. A
Pareto front of the best solutions could be established, and defenders could choose the best
solution from that front to fit their needs.
Other future work might include performing a complexity study to determine
whether the runtime of CANDLES is linear, superlinear, or sublinear depending on the
size of the network. While our network only had twenty nodes, it would be interesting
to measure the results when hundreds or even thousands of nodes are deployed in the de-
fender’s network. The analysis could be instructive when building other simulations or
attempting to apply CANDLES to a large enterprise network.
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In this thesis, two cyber security research frameworks are presented that apply com-
putational intelligence techniques to solve complex problems in network defense scenarios.
The first paper describes DCAFE, a framework that makes it possible to automate and con-
trol experiments in a distributed environment and allow for more realistic experiments to
be carried out. DCAFE facilitated experiments that optimized Windows logging configu-
rations to detect indicators of compromise, a form of automated system configuration. The
second and third papers describe the ongoing development of CANDLES, a coevolutionary
network defense simulation that explores possible attacker and defender strategies while
abstracting away unnecessary details. This system gave us the capability to determine how
adversaries on both sides would respond in various scenarios, creating a predictive capabil-
ity.
Work like this will continue to make network security systems more autonomous
and adaptive in the face of evolving adversaries. While it is impossible to know the future,
predictive analysis will make it possible to change defensive strategy as necessary depend-
ing on expected attack vectors. Ever more sophisticated tools will appear for developing,
testing, deploying, and maintaining both networks and the software infrastructure needed
to protect them. Computational intelligence has a key role to play here since it can flexi-
bly respond to unexpected changes in a way that traditional algorithms cannot. By placing
more of the intelligence into the software itself, it enables non-experts to use tools that are
otherwise unavailable to them, and experts can better utilize their time by focusing more
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on the problem and less on configuring the tools. Over time, it may also give defenders the
advantage they need to protect their networks against constantly changing adversaries.
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